

WITNESS STATEMENT

(CJ Act 1967, s.9; MC Act 1980, ss.5A(3)(a) and 5B; MC Rules 1981, r.70)

Statement of: Philip King Alcock

Age: Over 21

Occupation: Solicitor and Higher Court Advocate

This statement (consisting of 17 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated anything in it which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature:



19th March 2010

1. My full name is Philip King Alcock. I am a solicitor and higher court advocate of England and Wales. I qualified in England in 1988. Prior to that I was an advocate (barrister) and full partner of a leading solicitor's firm in Harare, Zimbabwe. I am English. I currently work on contract as a Senior Crown Prosecutor for the Crown Prosecution Service in Devon and Cornwall. I have very recently completed eight years practice as an International War Crime Prosecutor, firstly with the UN in Kosovo and then at the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
2. I became aware of Dr Ganić's arrest as a result of emails from former colleagues who had worked with me in war crimes investigations at the State Court of BiH and I also read of the event on the BBC internet website.
3. When I heard of the arrest I immediately realised that I possessed important, detailed and possibly unique information that was likely to be useful to any lawyers representing Dr Ganić. I also believe that the information that I possess is likely to be of assistance to the Home Office and any court here in the United Kingdom that will be required to deal with extradition proceedings for Dr Ganić.
4. On 17 October 2005, by a decision of the Office of High Representative ("OHR"), confirmed by the High Representative of the time, Paddy Ashdown,

I was appointed to the War Crime Chamber of the State Court of BiH ('the State Court') as an International Prosecutor. Under the Dayton Agreement of 1995, the OHR was created to oversee the civilian administration of BiH. The State Court, created at a cost of many millions of dollars, plays an essential judicial role within the diverse ethnic communities of BiH. It was set up to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and also to combat economic crime. It was designed from the outset to shun ethnic bias and was staffed by nationals drawn from all ethnicities and by selected internationals to set the required standards, provide essential guidance and assistance and to share the work of investigating and prosecuting the huge number of crimes that had been committed during the war of 1992 - 95.

5. The powers and mandate of the State Court emanated from a mandate by the UN Security Council, and its codes of criminal law and of practice and procedure were almost identical to those of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ('ICTY'). From the outset it was intended not simply to conduct investigations and prosecutions of its own, but also to receive transferred indictments from the ICTY itself, and to prosecute them to a standard acceptable to that distinguished court.
6. UN Security Council Resolution 1503, *inter alia*, called upon the international community to support the High Representative in his setting up of the War Crimes Chamber within the State Court. It was deemed of vital importance to the fledgling nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the rule of law there be strengthened and enforced objectively and effectively. Without redress of war crimes by way of expert and impartial justice, there was little hope of healing the wounds that those crimes had left amongst the ethnically divided peoples of Bosnia. The need for a national state court and a mature and unified war crime prosecution policy was immense and urgent.
7. This task could not be achieved without international legal and administrative assistance. The legal standard required was a high one, a standard that wherever possible matched the standards prevailing within the ICTY.



Accordingly, the OHR promulgated 'The Law on the Prosecutor's Office of BiH' providing for a number of international prosecutors to be appointed to the War Crimes Chamber. The number of international prosecutors envisaged was six. I was one of the first to be appointed. I was selected on the basis of the experience I had gained and success that I had achieved whilst working as an international prosecutor with the UN in Kosovo from 2001 to 2004.

8. Our mandate, as international prosecutors, was to work with selected national prosecutors of all three ethnic groups, i.e. Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Although the Chief Prosecutor was always a Bosnian national, we, the internationals, enjoyed considerable autonomy in that we were paid and employed by an internationally funded and inspected Registry to which the UK provided extensive funding and support. Further, we were directly managed by a Head of the War Crimes Chamber (Department) who, for the first four years, was always an international prosecutor. It had always been intended that our role would diminish as our national colleagues gained experience and expertise but, at all times relevant to my investigations into Dr. Ganić, my lines of enquiry were left to my personal judgment and discretion and were supported by very high standards of legal expertise through the international members of team members who assisted me.
9. Our work as international Prosecutors was built around teams. Each prosecutor was provided with a Legal Assistant who was always a highly qualified international law graduate from a reputable British or Western European University post-graduate faculty. Most of our Legal Assistants held Masters degrees and some had Doctorates. Many had published articles on International Criminal law and several spent occasional time as invited lecturers on that subject in various countries. Each prosecutor received further support from several national and international interns. The interns were the among the best candidates one could find, having been selected on the basis of distinguished and fierce competition. It was normal and usual for our recruited international interns to be top academic graduates and several were practising barristers. Every international prosecutor had a full-time personal interpreter




who was supported by a pool of approximately 30 further interpreters. These ensured constant and speedy translation of all documents, exhibits and statements that we required for our work.

10. We also enjoyed the assistance of a small pool of investigators. They were former police from higher ranks, recruited to assist us in enquiries where local state police were likely to be inept or unreliable, something not uncommon where the task involved investigation of a senior policeman or politician who still held office. They were invaluable to our work. We also enjoyed a superb legal library and the services of ex-military and academic researchers and analysts who supplied us with data on military units and with material gleaned from international sources. We also enjoyed full access to the investigations conducted by the ICTY and could draw on their archives to bolster our own discoveries. We had meticulous data bases, sophisticated information storage and retrieval and accordingly our investigations achieved a very high level of precision. It is no exaggeration to say that we were, undoubtedly, the most successful national war crimes tribunal in the world during our first three years of operation.

11. The prosecution office was broken into teams for six areas and sub-divided into groups who, in most teams, were made up of wholly national and wholly international sub-teams. My team's potential primary source of cases in the earliest days was derived from cases transferred to us from the ICTY. I received the case of Gojko Janković, a rapist and murderer who commanded a Bosnian Serb paramilitary group. I gained a conviction against him on almost all counts indicted and he was sentenced to 34 years imprisonment. This was a conspicuously successful result and compared well with the conviction of a co-accused in his crimes, Kunarac, who only received 17 years for almost identical crimes following his conviction at the ICTY.

12. I also successfully prosecuted two Bosnian Serb soldiers for the torture of captured Bosnian Muslim soldiers. These men were each sentenced to over 10 years imprisonment. I was particularly anxious to extend my activities to



ensure that I also investigated crimes against Bosnian Serbs. These, although less numerous than crimes against Bosnian Muslims, were by no means rare and it was important to investigate them to the utmost of one's abilities.

13. I concentrated upon two major investigations. The first of these concerned the murder of eight Bosnian Serb reservists that took place in Sarajevo on 22 April 1992. The second concerned the shooting of seven JNA soldiers and a civilian typist in Dobrovoljačka Street, in central Sarajevo, on 3 May 1992. The latter case is at the very heart of the Serbian indictment of Dr Ganić. I should end this paragraph not with a boast but with a statement. I won all the completed trials in Bosnia that I undertook. I did the same in Kosovo. I saw myself with a high calling, an obligation to uphold the standards of international criminal law, a duty to do the best as an Englishman representing my country, and a requirement to investigate crimes against any victims, without fear or favour, and to the very utmost of my ability. I believe that every member of my team shared the same ideals.
14. I was given the Dobrovoljačka investigation by my Chief Prosecutor of the time approximately three years ago. From then, within BiH, it was investigated by no other prosecutor. I will call it the Dr Ganić case for simplicity although it actually involves almost every civilian and military leader of importance within the Bosnian Government leadership of 1992. My base documents were those that Serbia now relies upon.
15. In brief terms the facts behind the case are these: open war had already broken out in various parts of Bosnia before 2 May 1992. Sarajevo airport was already in Bosnian Serb hands. The Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegović had declared Bosnia independent, and that independence had been recognised. He had also declared that the JNA, the old army common to all Yugoslavia before it began to disintegrate, must leave the new state of Bosnia. A few days before 2 May and with an EC escort, he had flown to Lisbon with his daughter, Sabina, the Deputy Prime Minister and his bodyguard. Whilst he was away, on 2 May 1992, the irregular elements of Bosnian Militia, in mixtures of civilian clothes



and fragmented uniforms, had surrounded and attacked the JNA military HQ Building in central Sarajevo. It housed General Kukanjac and approximately 250 JNA staff. There was also fierce street-fighting in central Sarajevo during which several Serb vehicles were destroyed and a number of Serb soldiers killed and wounded.

16. President Izetbegović arrived at Sarajevo airport that afternoon. General Mackenzie had authorised a waiting UNPROFOR escort that had gone to the airport to meet the President to withdraw before the President's aircraft landed. The President found himself at an airport in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. This allowed Kukanjac to have the President and his party held against their will by General Djurdjević's soldiers at Lukavica barracks near the airport. The President managed a television appearance that evening during which he appointed Dr Ganić to be acting President while he, Izetbegović, remained a hostage.

17. Dr Ganić, assisted by Colm Doyle and General MacKenzie, came and held talks with JNA General Aksentijević at the UN building the next morning and they agreed a scheme whereby Izetbegović and Kukanjac would meet there in that same building later that day to negotiate the exchange of the President for the free passage of all or some of Kukanjac and his JNA soldiers from the surrounded HQ to the safety of Lukavica Barracks. MacKenzie and Doyle then travelled to Lukavica to meet the President and to notify him and the JNA of what had been agreed. An UNPROFOR officer was also dispatched to Kukanjac's surrounded HQ. Independently of all this, Izetbegović and Kukanjac were speaking to each other on the telephone, unbeknown to UNPROFOR.

18. When MacKenzie arrived at Lukavica he found a new agreement awaiting him. That agreement largely governed the eventual journey of the President from Lukavica to the JNA HQ early that afternoon and the departure of a JNA convoy, containing all their soldiers, out of the HQ at approximately 6.50 pm that evening. The rear of the convoy was ambushed by part of the Bosnian



militia. Seven soldiers and a secretary were killed and quantities of military weapons, uniforms and other equipment were seized. The remaining JNA soldiers were held captive by the Bosnian forces for several days and a number of them were mistreated by their guards, several being severely beaten. Their release was then negotiated after two or three days.

19. Among the questions which I had to investigate were the following: was Ganić criminally responsible any war crime as a result of these events? Had he made a promise of safe conduct? Had he lured the JNA treacherously into the street? Had he ordered the killing of any JNA soldiers? Had he such knowledge of who had, and such command authority as to be guilty by superior responsibility? Was the attack the random impulse of wholly civilian, criminal elements? Was it the ill-disciplined and random response of unknown soldiers? Was it the order of a disobedient local commander? Was the whole thing the fault of Kukanjac and MacKenzie for deciding to go out without adequate assurances? Even if an agreement had been made, promulgated and conveyed in clear terms to the surrounding forces, were those terms breached?
20. Soon after I began my investigation into these events, I realised that I would never complete the investigation of all 15 suspects in my file within my four year term of service. I decided, therefore, to start with Dr Ganić, and to investigate my way down. I also decided to concentrate upon the alleged war crimes of 3 May 1992, namely the killing of seven soldiers and a civilian, rather than upon possible crimes of 2 May 1992 that are also named in the Serb indictment against Dr Ganić. This is because there is simply no logic in linking him with war crimes for 2 May, 1992. That was a day of simple war between the two ethnic groups and in the horrible street fighting of that day, there is no evidence whatsoever to connect Dr Ganić with the commission of any war crime. It is not a crime to simply fight a war. War crimes arise from illegal acts carried out by those participating in the war. I never saw nor heard of any conduct on the part of Dr. Ganić which would justify indicting him for any JNA deaths that occurred in Sarajevo street fighting on 2 May 1992. Until



the evening of that day, Dr Ganić was not the acting President. He was not even a member of the ruling SDA political party.

21. Accordingly, I concentrated upon events surrounding the kidnapping of President Izetbegović in the late afternoon of 2 May 1992, his appointment of Dr Ganić to be Acting President that evening when he was on television, Dr Ganić's discussions with General MacKenzie and with JNA General Aksentijević at the UNPROFOR building early the following morning, negotiations between President Izetbegović and JNA General Kukanjac that occurred by phone whilst Izetbegović was at Lukavica Barracks on the outskirts of Sarajevo, the effects of interventions by two senior JNA officers at Lukavica, namely General Djurdjevac and Colonel Gagovic, the role of Colm Doyle, the EC special representative, and the roles and decisions made by General MacKenzie and his UNPROFOR staff, including General Phillippe Morillon.

22. I investigated what liaison took place between UNPROFOR and the JNA and the Presidency. I also read dozens of statements taken by Serb authorities from surviving JNA soldiers. These included statements from Kukanjac, Djurdjević and Gagović. In Belgrade I further interviewed senior JNA officers who survived the convoy attack. I interviewed ordinary soldiers of lower rank who were provided for me by the assistance of Bosnian Serb police. I was given copies of all Serb intercepts of Bosnian Muslim radio transmissions relating to the convoy attack in Dobrovoljačka Street on 3 May. I interviewed the Serb JNA senior intelligence officer who received these intercepts and forwarded them to General Kukanjac's HQ in the hours before the JNA convoy went out into the street. I interviewed Colm Doyle in Ireland. I spoke to General Morillon. I flew to Canada and interviewed General MacKenzie. I took statements from Sabina Izetbegović, from the deputy Prime Minister and from the President's bodyguard. I further considered the fragmented nature of the Bosnian Muslim militia which fought in Sarajevo in early May 1992 and its potential for erratic and ill-disciplined actions.



23. I also considered and investigated the risk of independent civilian aggression, independent, that is, of a central Bosnian command. I gained expert knowledge of which units and forces were out on the street in Bosnia's name. I also took careful account of the roles of the various militia commanders acting beneath the level of Dr Ganić and interviewed three of the most senior of them. I spoke with secret witnesses from the Bosnian leadership.
24. It is over five months since I last studied this investigation and I am without my investigation file. Subject to allowances for this, however, I can state that the investigation into the role of Dr Ganić that I conducted was, I believe, of the utmost thoroughness. With the exception of one or two UNPROFOR subordinate officers, I managed to speak with all those still living who negotiated or were present at negotiations that led to the decision to allow the JNA convoy to move out, en masse on to Dobrovoljačka Street.
25. The evidence that I have assembled shows that the convoy disaster was indirectly triggered by the extraordinary absence of any EC or UNPROFOR escort for the returning President and his party on the afternoon of 2 May. The risks to an unescorted President on that very violent day in May were obvious. Colm Doyle himself had appealed for calm on television. EU members had been contacted about the unfolding events. Ethnic tensions were at boiling point. General MacKenzie told me that one of the reasons he authorised the waiting escort vehicle to depart was because he could not assure the safety of its crew.
26. The investigation also revealed that UNPROFOR was a fledgling force at that early stage in the war and that it had few troops or machines with which to enforce its wishes and poor communications with which to promulgate them. It had imperfect liaison with Colm Doyle in his EC role. General MacKenzie depended upon interpreters for his knowledge and for his relaying of directions and orders to others.



27. No one, Bosnian Muslim or otherwise, had made any agreements for the safe passage of the surrounded JNA forces during the television debate of 2 May nor, indeed, at any time on that day. Dr Ganić had made it clear on television that night that his priority was that the President be released before any such troop movement could be discussed. The evidence also showed that Dr Ganić was anxious to utilise the assistance of the EC and UNPROFOR in trying to obtain the President's freedom and that early on the morning of 3 May he came to the UN building to seek assistance. He made it clear early on that he was uncertain of what support and obedience his leadership would command amongst his forces. He conducted talks with General Aksentijević in the earlier part of the morning and these were chaired by Colm Doyle to the knowledge and approval of General MacKenzie. He attempted to video part of the proceedings.

28. These talks ended with a decision that President Izetbegović and General Kukanjac should be brought under safe conduct from their respective barracks and HQ to meet at the UN building and debate how the President should be exchanged. There was a travel formula allowing for the President to be seen at the Presidency en route. At this stage no agreement whatever existed on whether all or some of the JNA would be free to leave the HQ and if so, with or without weapons and military equipment. Whether any or all JNA would leave simultaneously with the President or only after his safe return to the Presidency was completely undecided.

29. The evidence obtained during the investigation also made it clear that, for cogent military reasons, the Bosnian militia, numerous enough in men, lacked weapons and equipment and were determined not to allow the JNA HQ to take equipment with them. They feared that such would be immediately used to support further attacks on the city of Sarajevo and its civilian inhabitants, and their intelligence - rightly or wrongly - indicated that further Serb armoured attacks upon Sarajevo were imminent. It is also clear that the prestige of UNPROFOR in both Bosnian Muslim and JNA eyes far outstripped its ability to fulfil the role they desired from it, namely to broker an agreement for the



safe return of the President against the safe release of all the JNA captives. Both sides mistrusted each other and saw UNPROFOR as an honest broker. However they failed to realise that General MacKenzie had no forces or strength to back up his word given in good faith..

30. The nature of the soldiers and armed men surrounding the HQ of the JNA has also been examined. It was a mixture of ex-JNA Bosnian reservists now within the Muslim "Patriotic League" or the "Green Berets" and also police, special police, police reservists and a number of militia falling outside those descriptions that included ex-gangsters and "toughs" led by Juka Prazina, a gangster who held favour with Izetbegović and who provided a source of armed men for the protection of Sarajevo during the early war days. Men like him were "loose cannons", passionate, hot-headed and hard to control. Serb survivors of the shootings all failed to identify the precise identities of their killers. Most recall young men in a mixture of military and civilian clothing, or purely civilian clothing. Some wore 'lily' insignia but there were no men that I spoke with who knew whether those who first opened fire were military or civilian, amateur or professional.

31. I believe that I have had all the intercepts read or simultaneously translated to me. Dr Ganić at an early stage either says or is reported to say 'But that is not what we agreed'. A Serb intercept indicates that he ordered that no one and nothing shall be allowed to leave the HQ. My interview with the Serb JNA intelligence officer shows that these intercepts were several hours earlier in the day than the movement of the convoy.

32. General MacKenzie told me that he did not remember news of these intercepts being relayed to General Kukanjac. This may provide a clue to the degree of knowledge or lack of it that General MacKenzie had, since such information was quite undoubtedly passed on to General Kukanjac whilst MacKenzie was at the HQ some time before the convoy departed. Importantly, General MacKenzie does remember his UN subordinate officer coming up to him quite shortly before the departure of the convoy to report, 'Ganić says that the deal



is off. I asked the General why, in that event, he and Kukanjac decided to take the convoy out on the road. He replied that he had to make a value judgment, to weigh the risk of attack against the priority of obtaining the release of the President and that faced with the dilemma again he would repeat his decision. General MacKenzie had blamed Dr Ganić for the events in Dobrovoljačka Street when speaking on television in years that followed the event. I asked him whether Dr Ganić knew the terms of the agreement. When I interviewed him I established that General MacKenzie mistakenly believed that after the morning talks at the UN building Dr Ganić had remained there. In fact he had almost immediately returned to the Presidency.

33. I also established that General MacKenzie simply assumed that Izetbegović had relayed the terms of the agreement that he later made with Kukanjac back to the Presidency either whilst the President was still at Lukavica or during the hours whilst he was at the JNA HQ. General MacKenzie also believed that General Morillon had passed the agreement terms to Ganić. I telephoned the General who is now an MEP at Strasbourg. He agreed that he had spoken to Ganić that day but did not agree that he had passed on the terms of the Izetbegović agreement. I should add that General Morillon speaks English with a very strong accent and is not easy to understand.

34. There is also the fact that at least some who were present when President Izetbegović spoke to Kukanjac believe that the agreement was limited to allowing JNA soldiers to leave but not priceless JNA equipment that the Bosnian forces desired, and which would otherwise be turned to use in attacking Sarajevo and its inhabitants. Sabina, the President's daughter, thought that an embargo on truck numbers was made, a maximum of either 20 or 30 trucks for the evacuation. The deputy prime minister had a similar recollection. All JNA evidence (except Kukanjac's statements) suggests that Kukanjac would have been willing to go and see President Izetbegović at the HQ building on 3 May. He was in fact prevented from doing so, possibly even at gun point, by his own officers who said that he was not going to escape whilst they were left to face the danger. Likewise at Lukavica, Colonel Gagović who had lost beloved soldiers in the previous day of fighting, claims

that he took a lead ignoring what Aksentijević and Ganić had agreed and in absolutely insisting that all JNA soldiers be released without any debate or exception. He was so angry that he actually threatened to shoot Colm Doyle. And in fact every soldier and every item that could be removed was eventually placed within the JNA convoy, which might well have been in breach of the terms of the agreement, or at any rate the agreement as it stood at such prior time – if ever – that it was allegedly conveyed to the Presidency or to Dr Ganić.

35. There is also evidence from the frantic arguments of Bosnian field leaders surrounding the HQ to suggest that local commanders might have over-ridden orders from leaders above them simply because they felt that the survival of Sarajevo dictate the capture of the JNA weapons in the convoy as an imperative for the defence of Sarajevo. It is clear also that at least some forces at Dobrovoljačka Street did not know what the President had agreed. General MacKenzie reports speaking to a soldier and saying that the President had made a safe conduct agreement. He got a reply to the effect, 'Fuck the President, he is either a prisoner or dead'. So much for the effective promulgation of the terms of an agreement.

36. Surviving senior JNA officers with whom I spoke in Belgrade were blunt in their condemnation of General Kukanjac. One Colonel told me that he was in a truck with a colleague who was killed in the street shortly afterwards. The officer said that before the convoy set out, he said to his companion, 'We are going to our deaths'. This same Colonel told me that there was no imperative reason for the JNA convoy to leave that evening. Although surrounded, he claims that they could have remained safe for several more days, allowing time for their release to be better arranged. All the officers at the HQ to whom I spoke assured me that Kukanjac was informed of intercepts suggesting an attack and that he should not have gone ahead with the movement of the convoy. Kukanjac, who was dismissed from his post five days later, says in his statements given to the Serb authorities that he went out because, 'MacKenzie



guaranteed my safety. However, when I spoke to him General MacKenzie was emphatic that he had guaranteed nothing.

37. From the above facts, plus many more to which I would need access to my files in order to recite, I do not think that there is any realistic prospect that Dr Ganić would be convicted of any war crimes for the convoy attack if he were to be tried in a fair and impartial tribunal. He himself had uncertain authority. What he knew is uncertain. He never agreed to any safe passage for the JNA when he came to the UN. Precisely what the President agreed with Kukanjac via telephone at Lukavica is uncertain, the exact terms being remembered differently by those present.

38. Equally there is at least a possibility that the agreement was either broken or modified at JNA wishes once the President arrived at the JNA HQ. There is no evidence of who brought news of the agreement to Dr Ganić or if this was done efficiently and fully or in partial terms. There is no evidence as to whether it was done in BCS (Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian) or via a translator. It is simply no good to have a captive President within a captive HQ saying, 'I guarantee your safety' unless one obtains a clear assurance from those outside that this is accepted and promulgated to those outside. This was assumed by General MacKenzie but was never done. When he heard that 'Ganić says the deal is off', there was nothing to prevent him making a further call to or having a discussion with the Presidency and deciding to delay departure until a clear understanding was verified.

39. Further, there is no clear evidence as to who committed the killings of the JNA soldiers and the civilian. It might have been men outside any effective command. It is clear that order was quite quickly restored and most JNA were not treated in this way. Was the brief flurry of killings the work of "gangsters" outside the limited Bosnian Command chain? If Ganić was planning a treacherous attack outside the proper rules of war why would he or the Presidency send a message to say 'that is not what we agreed' or later (

apparently) 'the deal is off'. That is fair warning rather than treachery or perfidy.

40. One must remember, too, the very explosive emotions of those days. Violence could erupt at a moment's notice and communications were piecemeal and largely limited to a few working telephones and handheld radios that were few and far between on the Bosnian side.
41. My assessment of Dr Ganić's role is that he was not culpable. While any suspicions obviously had to be investigated, I thoroughly investigated those suspicions and the results of the investigation demonstrated that there was no basis for proceeding against Dr. Ganić.
42. Equally I do not consider that Dr. Ganić bears any liability for any subsequent mistreatment of JNA captive soldiers in the days that followed. He was no longer acting in control. He was not a police or military leader and the President was back in office by that time. I believe criminal liability for the possible torture of soldiers probably lies at the door of the military police or of the special police or both. It could ascend above them to the then Minister for Defence but not to Ganić.
43. I do not know of subsequent evidence since I handed over my file, in October 2009, which would change my opinion.
44. I have had opportunity to speak with members of the Serbian War Crime Prosecution Office and it was clear to me that they displayed bias to the point of illogicality when investigating crimes against their people. I have noticed that they make sweeping assumptions based on misinterpretation and prejudice. . I believe that there is a political imperative in their decision to issue the wide indictment that they have published. It is significant that years of alleged impartial investigation have failed to weed out suspects. My enquiries have ruled out two persons at least from the Serb list and I had not even touched upon most of the suspects.



