

# **The Internet Governance Forum (IGF)**

## **Second Meeting**

*Rio de Janeiro 12-15 November 2007*

### Synthesis Paper

Prepared by the IGF Secretariat

*The Forum is modest in its means but not in its aspirations. Its hallmark is multi-stakeholder collaboration, based on the exchange of information and the sharing of best practices. This new form of international cooperation is both inclusive and egalitarian. And it presents governments, the private sector and civil society, including academic and technical communities, with the opportunity to work together towards a sustainable, robust, secure and stable Internet, as envisioned by the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.*

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

## Contents

	<i>page</i>
I. Introduction	3
II. The Substantive Agenda of the Rio de Janeiro Meeting	4
A. General Comments	4
B. Critical Internet Resources	5
C. Access	6
D. Diversity	7
E. Openness	8
F. Security	9
III. The Role and Functioning of the IGF	11
A. General Comments	11
B. The Annual Meeting	13
C. The Advisory Group	14
D. The Dynamic Coalitions	15
IV. The Way Forward	16
 Annex I List of Submissions	 18
Annex II Glossary	20

## **I. Introduction**

1. This background paper is conceived as an input into the discussions of the second IGF meeting. It summarizes the 28 submissions that were received from 13 different contributors prior to the consultations held in Geneva on 3 September 2007. The paper was distributed as an input into these consultations in the form of a working draft. It also draws on earlier contributions and papers and the interventions made during these consultations, also through remote participation. This paper does not necessarily cover every argument in every submission; all the submissions can be found, in full, on the IGF Web site: <http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions.htm>. The transcripts of the consultation meetings are also available, in full, on the IGF Web site.

2. The inaugural meeting of the IGF was held in Athens, on 30 October – 2 November 2006. As a follow-up to that meeting the Secretariat issued a call for contributions on the IGF Web site on 11 December 2006 with the aim to take stock of the Athens meeting, assess what worked well and what worked less well and make suggestions with regard to the preparation of the meeting in Rio de Janeiro. To stimulate the discussion, the Secretariat set up an online forum on the IGF Web site. More than 800 users joined the forum and seven active discussion threads were developed on the four broad themes of the Athens meeting as well as on how to improve remote participation.

3. As a first step for preparing the Rio de Janeiro meeting, a stock taking session took place on 13-14 February 2007. A synthesis paper<sup>1</sup> was produced as an input into the February meeting. The paper addressed both the things that worked well and those that worked less well in the inaugural meeting of the IGF.

4. The preparatory process for the second meeting of the IGF was conducted in an open, inclusive and transparent manner. Three rounds of public consultations, open to all stakeholders, were held in Geneva on 13 February, on 23 May and on 3 September. From these consultations emerged a draft programme and schedule for the second meeting of the IGF. The consultations allowed all stakeholders, including individual participants with proven expertise and experience, to take part on an equal footing.

5. As with the first year, there was a general view that the IGF needed to maintain an overall development orientation. Capacity building was the most frequently mentioned issue in the public consultations and was also referred to in several of the contributions. It was presented not only in terms of the growing consensus for its priority in enabling meaningful participation but also as a specific policy issue. When looking at capacity building, it was pointed out that access to education and knowledge was a recognized human right. The necessity of fostering the ability of all stakeholders from all countries to participate in the process of Internet governance was also pointed out. It was suggested that explicit action should be taken to explore the offering of relevant Internet governance educational resources online.

6. The second IGF meeting to be held in Rio de Janeiro will include the four themes from the first meeting in Athens as well as a fifth theme, relating to critical Internet resources. In addition, the programme will also include a session on emerging issues. The agenda, as announced by the Secretary-General and posted on the IGF Web site, is as follows:

- Critical Internet resources;

---

<sup>1</sup> Available on the IGF Web site

- Access;
- Diversity;
- Openness;
- Security.

7. On 20 August the mandate of the Advisory Group was renewed. The UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser for Internet Governance Nitin Desai, and Hadil da Rocha Vianna, Director for Scientific and Technological Affairs in Brazil's Ministry of External Relations, representing the Host Country, were appointed as co-chairs of the Advisory Group. The 47 Advisory Group members serve in their personal capacity. They have been chosen from governments, the private sector and civil society, including the academic and technical communities, from all regions.

## **II. The Substantive Agenda of the Rio de Janeiro Meeting**

### **A. General Comments**

8. There was a general recognition that the first IGF meeting in Athens, Greece, had been an effective beginning that should be built upon. It was pointed out that the IGF should continue as a forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue as foreseen in the Tunis Agenda<sup>2</sup>.

9. Issues surrounding the nature of Internet governance were raised by several of the contributions to the IGF consultation process. These contributions focused on several themes, in particular the general organizational setting of existing Internet governance mechanisms, the processes they invoke as well as the management and tasks of Internet governance organizations.

10. One contributor<sup>3</sup> wrote about discussions in Africa that emphasized the importance of localizing Internet governance. The localization would enable not only the expression of local concerns, but would help in bringing these perspectives to international attention. There was also a strong concern for ensuring the multi-stakeholder nature of the communities at the local level, as well as at the regional and international levels.

11. Several of the comments received during the course of the year discussed the ways in which Internet governance mechanisms could only be understood in a broader set of issues and international and national policy frameworks. For example, the contribution of the Council of Europe (CoE) pointed out that Internet governance, for its members, incorporated the principles and frameworks that are designed to ensure development of the Internet and the Information Society. Thus, Internet governance issues embrace *The European Convention on Human Rights* and other Council of Europe instruments, like the *Cybercrime Convention*, which provide a framework for examining State responsibilities and guiding State policies.

12. The Council of Europe also expressed the view that Internet governance should be governed in all respects by human rights, particularly the freedom of expression.

---

<sup>2</sup> Portugal on behalf of the European Union

<sup>3</sup> Internet Society (ISOC)

13. It was suggested<sup>4</sup> treating development along side the five other themes as a major thematic focus as a way to ensure that sufficient attention was paid to the development dimension.

14. One contribution<sup>5</sup> stated that there had been little discussion about the definition of a development agenda. Identifying the development agenda with capacity building was inadequate as this just helped to reinforce the status quo.

15. It was suggested<sup>6</sup> that the IGF focus more on governance issues proper, such as concrete policies and programmes adopted by the relevant intergovernmental, private sector, and multi-stakeholder organizations and networks that were involved in security and governance.

## **B. Critical Internet Resources**

16. While all contributions that wrote of critical Internet resource issues underscored the importance of names and numbers, several of the contributions supported a broad concept of critical resources. The definition of critical Internet resources contained in the report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which included issues relating to infrastructure, technical standards, peering and interconnection, telecommunications infrastructure, including innovative and convergent technologies, and multilingualization, was highlighted in this regard. The point was made that discussions on this issue should also include the varying perspectives of all stakeholders<sup>7</sup>.

17. A government contribution<sup>8</sup> made some concrete proposals:

- The inclusion of capacity training in the details of the management of critical Internet resources should be part of the IGF agenda. This could be done by the relevant stakeholders currently responsible for the mechanisms and structures involved in the status quo of the current administration of critical resources.
- That all stakeholders, especially governments, use the platform of the IGF to discuss the participation in the public policy issues of the governance of critical Internet resources. These discussions should reflect “fully the principles of multilateralism, democracy and transparency of Internet governance”.
- There should be a discussion on the distribution of Internet addresses “within the IGF framework on how to ensure the equitable access by all countries to IPv6 address resources and how to promote balanced development of future Internet in all countries particularly developing countries during the transition from IPv4 to Ipv6”.
- There should be discussions concerning the issue of “equitable addition, deletions and adjustment of gTLDs.”

18. Another contribution<sup>9</sup> stated that the governance of critical Internet resources had significant public policy implications. When private organizations, for example the Internet

---

<sup>4</sup> William Drake

<sup>5</sup> IT for Change

<sup>6</sup> William Drake

<sup>7</sup> International Chamber of Commerce – Business Action to Support the Information Society (ICC/BASIS)

<sup>8</sup> The People's Republic of China

<sup>9</sup> Council of Europe (CoE)

Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), were responsible for these resources, especially the resources that affected state public policy concerns, these organizations became agents of the state and should be subject to state regulation and oversight. They also wrote that ICANN, which is currently only answerable to the United States, should be answerable to the international community at large.

19. It was commented<sup>10</sup> that the current private sector led arrangements for Internet operations and management were working well and should not be changed. It was also pointed out that since ICANN was still under a contract with the United States Government, a way to achieve greater neutrality and to promote global management of the Internet should be discussed.

20. One contribution<sup>11</sup> recommended that “the political assumptions and objectives of existing structures and processes” in governance of critical Internet resources be examined. An examination needed to be undertaken of the political assumptions and objectives of existing structures and processes of such governance, including an examination of who the beneficiaries are from the status quo. Such a discussion needed to examine the nature of technical issues versus public policy, the nature of their overlap/ interface, as well as their appropriate institutional mechanisms.

21. The addition of critical Internet resources as a stand alone topic was questioned<sup>12</sup>, as was what was termed “the added value of a separate debate considering that there are no clear boundaries from the other main themes” that also related to critical Internet resources. The need for a clear definition of the framework for the discussions was also emphasized. Issues already decided at WSIS should not be reopened and the work of existing organizations should not be challenged.

22. The view was also held<sup>13</sup> that the critical Internet resources theme should be viewed within a broader context of Internet governance and should be linked to national and local management of these resources.

## **C. Access**

23. Many speakers during the preparatory process pointed out that despite the rapid spread of the Internet, five billion people remained without access to this important tool for economic growth and social development. They recalled that access could, therefore, be the single most important issue to most people, in particular in developing countries.

24. One contribution<sup>14</sup> wrote that achieving the public service value of the Internet required universal and affordable access to ICT infrastructure for all. In their view this required a stable legal and regulatory structure that made it safe for businesses to invest. They also called on States to provide public access points to provide a “minimum set of communication and information facilities, in accordance with the principle of universal community service”.

---

<sup>10</sup> e.g. Nippon Keidanren, ETNO, ICC/BASIS, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), World Information Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA)

<sup>11</sup> IT for Change

<sup>12</sup> European Telecommunications Network Operators Association (ETNO)

<sup>13</sup> Kuwait Information Technology Society

<sup>14</sup> CoE

25. It was also pointed out<sup>15</sup> that building out infrastructure was indispensable for bridging the digital divide especially in rural areas. Any build out of infrastructure should be accompanied by education on ways of using the Internet.

26. The importance of the 'Access to Access theme' with the context of access to knowledge was emphasized. Without capacity building in the fundamental skills necessary to use the technology the Internet brings, “considerable portions of the population [that] would never have access”<sup>16</sup>.

27. There was one report from an Internet governance session at a meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2007. Speakers at this meeting spoke of the importance of encouraging regulatory reform at the local level in order to enable “a more conducive and lower cost access environment”<sup>17</sup>.

28. The importance of an enabling environment at the national level to improve access was emphasized by several contributors and speakers. In their view, it was important to stress the legal, policy, and regulatory conditions that enable private sector investment and innovation, promote competition and foster entrepreneurship in order to promote access to the infrastructure and the Internet<sup>18</sup>.

29. A contribution from the business community<sup>19</sup> wrote of the importance of the public sector recommendations from the WTO in establishing the correct regulatory and political environment for the deployment and public adoption of a broadband infrastructure. Elements of this policy included telecommunications liberalization as well as pro-competitive regulations for basic telecommunications. They also discussed the importance of ensuring efficient and effective use of the radio spectrum, which could involve removal of government restrictions on the services that can be used on certain frequencies and the elimination of artificial spectrum scarcity. In the case of rural, remote and other under accessed services, this contribution supports government policy to provide such access, including some subsidization for rural or lower income customers, if these are pursued in a transparent and competition neutral manner and through the use of general tax revenues or tax incentives.

#### **D. Diversity**

30. While it was generally applauded that by now almost one billion people use the Internet, it was also pointed out that many of these people could not read or write in English, and that these people also used languages that do not use the Latin alphabet. It was generally recognized that people everywhere should be able to use the Internet in their own language. A multilingual Internet would foster an inclusive, democratic, legitimate, respectful, and locally empowering Information Society.

---

<sup>15</sup> Nippon Keidanren

<sup>16</sup> Findings from the Internet Society's Internet governance session at the INET meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, 4 May 2007

<sup>17</sup> Findings from the Internet Society's Internet governance session at the INET meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, 4 May 2007

<sup>18</sup> e.g. ICC/BASIS, ITAA, WITSA

<sup>19</sup> ICC/BASIS

31. One contribution<sup>20</sup> discussed the importance of promoting and protecting locally developed content, including content that is not commercially viable, as a means of increasing the diversity on the Internet. They also discussed the importance of language communities in developing multilingual content, including content in indigenous and minority languages.

32. It was suggested<sup>21</sup> that stakeholders should share technology and know-how to help the elderly and people with disabilities to use the network without the stress they normally experience in dealing with the Internet.

33. Several contributions discussed the importance of Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) as essential for continued Internet development. One<sup>22</sup> indicated that “a multilingual environment will increase local interest in Internet content and increase the possibilities for all language groups to share and access information in their own languages”.

34. It was stated<sup>23</sup> that the introduction of IDN could become mired in many problems that could adversely affect business and consumers alike. A major concern involved the confusion that might occur across language, or script, boundaries. These confusions could affect consumer trust of trademarks and make protecting the intellectual property rights prohibitively expensive for business. Concerns also extended to the fraudulent use that could be done in the case of confusion used for phishing attacks. Another major concern for the business community was the need to maintain a single domain name space across various language and script boundaries.

## **E. Openness**

35. Throughout the preparatory process, many speakers and contributors highlighted the importance of openness as one of the key founding principles and characteristics of the Internet. The open nature of the Internet was seen as part of its uniqueness, and its importance as a tool to advance human development. It was emphasized that the Internet provided for a robust and unencumbered exchange of information, and welcomed millions of individuals as users from all corners of the world. Internet users traded ideas and information and built on both, thus increasing the wealth of knowledge for everyone, today and in the future. The openness of the Internet was also seen as a key feature to ensure its stability and security.

36. Many have pointed out that the Internet makes it possible for more people than ever before to communicate and therefore to express themselves. Access to knowledge and empowering people with information and knowledge that is available on the Internet was seen as a critical objective of an inclusive Information Society and to continued economic and social development.

37. Several contributions stressed the importance that the Internet be underpinned by the democratic values of openness and accessibility.

38. One contribution<sup>24</sup>, while recognizing legitimate public policy objectives such as

---

<sup>20</sup> CoE

<sup>21</sup> Nippon Keidanren

<sup>22</sup> CoE

<sup>23</sup> ICC/BASIS

<sup>24</sup> ICC/BASIS



protecting the general public, and particularly children, from objectionable Internet content and prohibiting the use of the Internet for criminal activity and information that could be prejudicial to global security, cautioned against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on Internet content, given the benefits of increased information flows and trade for society. It stated that direct action by governments in the interception and monitoring of Internet content could compromise the overall security and confidence of users in the Internet. It recommended a policy of self-regulation with voluntary labelling as an alternative to legislation. In case where legislation was absolutely necessary, the contribution recommended that the legislation be clear, precise and narrowly focused to those abuse areas requiring such legislation, as unnecessary legislation had what was termed a “chilling effect” on the Internet as a tool for business and for promoting economic development. Additionally, such legislations should not place undue burdens or costs on business and should limit the liability put on Internet service providers.

39. The view was held while government regulations should be created against content that infringed on trademarks or privacy, there should be cooperation between governments and self-regulation on harmful content such as obscenity. Self-regulation in Japan, for instance, had been effective in finding an effective balance between the protection of copyright and privacy, and freedom of opinion and expression<sup>25</sup>.

## **F. Security**

40. Many contributors and speakers throughout the preparatory process emphasized that Internet security was a key element of building confidence and trust among users of ICTs. They argued that the Internet had the potential to enable users to access and generate a wealth of information and opportunity. Achieving the Internet’s full potential to support commercial and social relationships required an environment that promoted and ensured users’ trust and confidence and provided a stable and secure platform.

41. The importance of addressing the problems of international security, including cyber-terrorism and cyber-extremism was emphasized<sup>26</sup>. Several of the contributions discussed the issues of Web security and cybercrime, especially in regards to children’s safety.

42. The Council of Europe also included a recommendation for the applicability of various international conventions such as those:

- on cybercrime;
- on prevention of terrorism;
- on protection of individuals and automatic processing of personal data;
- on action against trafficking in human beings;
- on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.

43. The Council of Europe drew particular attention to its *Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*, which was to be opened for signature in October 2007 for all States, both European and non-European. This convention *inter alia* requires States to criminalize conduct such as knowingly accessing child pornography on the Internet and the soliciting of children for sexual purposes. The security of the Internet and the protection of children were described as a priority for the Council of Europe, and as the central focus of its Open Forum in Rio de Janeiro.

---

<sup>25</sup> Nippon Keidanren

<sup>26</sup> Russian Federation

44. A contribution from a university<sup>27</sup> recommended a solution for protecting children on the Internet from pornography and predators. The solution would involve zoning Internet ports so that all pornography would be kept off the port normally used for Web traffic, but would rather be moved a port specifically designated for adult traffic. The proposal explained that based on the *Declaration of the Rights of the Child*, zoning of the Internet was justifiable in the defence and protection of children.

45. It was proposed<sup>28</sup> that ICANN should accept responsibility for controlling online illegal content and for protecting children from Internet pornography. Their proposal built on the responsibility that ICANN has for the domain name system (DNS). Specifically the proposal included using the existing structure of contracts, MOUs and policies to help countries in carrying out their regulation of pornography.

46. The view was held<sup>29</sup> that because users were entitled to security, they could ultimately hold the state responsible for a security failure in the Internet. There were concerns<sup>30</sup> that security issues in the Internet would erode the confidence that users needed in order to do business on the Internet. This was tied into a notion of trust in the Internet, though the notions of trust were broader than just security and extended to the idea that the Internet was a space of freedom that people could use with confidence.

47. For the business community<sup>31</sup> the main role for government was to raise awareness and promote a culture of Internet security that balanced the responsibilities of users and businesses. Business remained committed to fighting cybercrime.

48. The point was made<sup>32</sup> that national and regional efforts may not be enough to deal with problems such as email virus distribution or cybercrime. The cross-border nature of cybercrime made dealing with it especially difficult, making this an issue that requires international cooperation on best practices and international response mechanisms like the Forum of Incident and Security Teams.

49. Raising user awareness about Internet security was seen as a priority<sup>33</sup> and as a key for developing economies in order to build secured infrastructures for people to access the Internet. As the Internet went beyond national boundaries, it was important to share know-how and the best practices on a global basis. Several contributions included the concern that people should be educated in using the Internet safely and with respect for others. There was also a concern that education should extend to other issues on Internet security such as the activities of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). They provided an effective framework in this regard, as they were able to provide rapid notification of security incidents and for adopting measures against current and future threat.

---

<sup>27</sup> Brigham Young University

<sup>28</sup> Cheryl Preston and Brent A. Little

<sup>29</sup> CoE

<sup>30</sup> CoE and ICC/BASIS

<sup>31</sup> ICC/BASIS

<sup>32</sup> Nippon Keidanren

<sup>33</sup> Nippon Keidanren

### III. The Role and Functioning of the IGF

#### A. General Comments

50. The role and functioning of the IGF was debated in several of the submissions and commented on by many speakers. While different opinions were expressed as to how its mandate should be implemented, most contributions and statements underlined the unique, if not experimental character of the IGF as a platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation. One speaker<sup>34</sup> praised the IGF for the innovative approach of discussions among equals that allowed a “dynamic and collaborative experience”.

51. There was strong support for the multi-stakeholder principle. Many contributions and speakers<sup>35</sup> discussed the importance of the multi-stakeholder nature of the IGF, and emphasized the continued importance of stakeholders participating on an equal footing. The multi-stakeholder approach was described as the baseline for the IGF<sup>36</sup>.

52. It was pointed out<sup>37</sup> that the IGF multi-stakeholder model was not only important to the IGF itself, but “also [to] lots of people outside who see in this a potential for a model for other areas of governance”. One remote participant<sup>38</sup> described the multi-stakeholder model as “one of the most important innovations that IGF may carry forward, for the whole UN system”. He saw in it a potential for change in governance at the UN itself that could have some far-reaching effects.

53. Several speakers called for a balance among stakeholders, in particular, from developing countries<sup>39</sup>. Some concern was expressed about the balance of interests in a multi-stakeholder environment. It was argued that the IGF could be in danger of being captured by dominant political and business interests<sup>40</sup>.

54. Many references were made to the IGF mandate as set out in the *Tunis Agenda*. A government contribution<sup>41</sup> emphasized the importance of focusing “on the public policy issues related to Internet governance in accordance with the mandates of IGF as tasked by the Tunis Phase of World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)<sup>42</sup>”.

55. The point was made<sup>43</sup> that Athens had been free of negotiation, arranged seating, and lengthy policy statements and that it therefore had been in line with the mandate and remained

---

<sup>34</sup> ISOC

<sup>35</sup> e.g., EU, the People’s Republic of China, ICC/BASIS, ITAA, ETNO, Nippon Keidanren

<sup>36</sup> ITAA, WITSA

<sup>37</sup> Co-Chair Nitin Desai

<sup>38</sup> David Allen

<sup>39</sup> e.g. Co-Chair Hadil da Rocha Vianna

<sup>40</sup> IT for Change

<sup>41</sup> People’s Republic of China

<sup>42</sup> Comments on the Draft Programme Outline for the Second Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) by the People’s Republic of China, 27 Aug. 2007

<sup>43</sup> ISOC

neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding.

56. Several comments were made<sup>44</sup> on the causes for the IGF's success to date and the view was held that this was because it did not attempt to make decisions, but rather allowed for open discussion by all stakeholders in an open atmosphere. It was underlined<sup>45</sup> that the “value of the IGF is its open and informative nature, allowing a variety of views to be expressed, and the full range of experience and expertise to be shared so that all can continue to learn more about how to use, grow and expand, and protect the key communications and information resource that the Internet has become”.

57. Several structural recommendations for the IGF were made in one contribution<sup>46</sup>. The first of these involved including a thorough self assessment and self examination of the IGF, conducted in an open and transparent manner, as a regular exercise at IGF meeting. It further recommended that the IGF develop a process for making recommendations. The contribution stated that this was mandated by the Tunis Agenda. It recommended that the IGF work towards a multi-stakeholder ‘standing IGF committee’ (or working group) along the lines of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which would give regular, non-binding recommendations on different Internet governance issues. This body could follow the WGIG model of providing a consensus-based recommendations report, and of placing other strong points and proposals that do not get complete consensus into a background paper.

58. However, other speakers<sup>47</sup> expressed their concern that any attempt to add greater structure to the IGF or the Advisory Group would limit its ability to “facilitate constructive change”.

59. The IGF was described<sup>48</sup> as “the only truly global and democratic forum for multi-stakeholder participation in Internet governance, and that it should, therefore, be strengthened and made more effective in a manner that it is able to fulfil all parts of the Tunis mandate.” The comment also stated that the IGF should not be diluted by fears that it could be a method for a governments’ takeover of the Internet.

60. To prevent that, it was argued<sup>49</sup> that the IGF should focus on the development issues surrounding the Internet as a public infrastructure with a strong public goods perspective.

61. Several interventions recommended greater transparency in the planning and preparatory process of the IGF meeting and with regard to Advisory Group meetings. There was broad support of providing adequate resources for greater online and remote participation, including discussion and deliberation<sup>50</sup>.

---

<sup>44</sup> e.g. ITAA, Nippon Keidanren

<sup>45</sup> ITAA

<sup>46</sup> Jeremy Malcolm

<sup>47</sup> ISOC, ICC/BASIS, ITAA, WITSA

<sup>48</sup> IT for Change

<sup>49</sup> IT for Change

<sup>50</sup> e.g. Jeremy Malcolm, Malcolm Hutter

## **B. The Annual Meeting**

62. Different views were held as regards the purpose of the annual meeting of the IGF.

63. Some saw the merit of the meeting in the meeting itself. Proponents of this school of thought held the view that the IGF should promote the objectives, specifically facilitating the exchange of information and best practices, strengthening the engagement of stakeholders in Internet governance issues, particularly those from the developing world, contributing to capacity building for Internet governance in developing countries, promoting and assessing on an ongoing basis WSIS principles in Internet governance processes, and helping to identify solutions to issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet<sup>51</sup>. The point was made<sup>52</sup> that steps that would seek to impose more structure on the IGF or the Advisory Group would be contrary to the spirit of the IGF.

64. One speaker<sup>53</sup> compared the annual meeting to the chaotic creativity of the Edinburgh International Arts Festival, which was based on a similar bottom-up type of approach. While she agreed on the need for focus, she warned against a controlling, top-down approach.

65. An individual contribution<sup>54</sup> contained an extended analysis of the theoretical basis for collective decision making in the context of the reform of Internet governance. His contribution also produced a report card of the IGF's first year and recommendations for ways in which the IGF could be improved. Specifically, his recommendations, based on his analysis of the “specific roles of policy setting and coordination that are inherent in the IGF's function as a governance network, as well as being mandated by the Tunis Agenda” suggested reorganizing the IGF meeting to be less of an annual event and more of a process that would coordinate intersessional and regional events.

66. A government intervention<sup>55</sup> held the view that the IGF should be more than what was referred to as a ‘talking shop’ and that some concrete and practical results should be achieved by the annual meeting. Another speaker also expressed her preference for some written document, such as a communiqué at the closing session<sup>56</sup>.

67. Several speakers spoke out against producing a formal report of the IGF, including summary reports of workshops because the multi-stakeholder process of producing such reports would need to resemble the negotiating process of WSIS<sup>57</sup>. They did support the creation of a narrative chair's report as was read out in Athens.

68. The IGF was described<sup>58</sup> as “first and foremost a learning experience for all participants and a space for finding out what other people have identified as a good practice”. In this vision,

---

<sup>51</sup> ICC/BASIS

<sup>52</sup> ISOC

<sup>53</sup> Emily Taylor

<sup>54</sup> Jeremy Malcolm

<sup>55</sup> The People's Republic of China

<sup>56</sup> Senegal

<sup>57</sup> LACNIC, AfriNIC, Alejandro Pisanty

<sup>58</sup> Alejandro Pisanty

participants would go back with the lessons they have learned and try to bring this experience into their own environment. Such an experience could not be reflected in any single paper, but would be represented by action in the national and international arenas for the years to come.

### **C. The Advisory Group**

69. The discussion on the role and composition of the Advisory Group revealed different approaches. While some felt that there was a need for more structure and procedure, others felt comfortable with the way the group had been operating so far.

70. One speaker<sup>59</sup>, while welcoming a degree of flexibility in the work of the Advisory Group, nevertheless called for a more structured work process. She pointed out that participation required transparency, good information, a good flow of communication and accountability. She therefore would welcome a little bit more procedure with regard to time frames for submission on aspects of the Advisory Group's work, such as for submitting content, comment on the agenda, names of speakers.

71. One speaker<sup>60</sup> suggested asking members of the Advisory Group to do a self-assessment of how effective they feel they have been in fulfilling their role. A review and assessment process should take every year to allow the Advisory Group reflect on its own functioning.

72. There was a general agreement that the group needed to be balanced. Some felt that the balance needed to be improved with regard to geographical diversity and gender balance, and in particular a stronger representation of developing countries was called for by several speakers. Others focused on the balance between different stakeholder groups and one speaker<sup>61</sup> stated that the present composition with 50% government representatives did not fully reflect the multi-stakeholder principle of all stakeholders participating on an equal footing and that this should be corrected in the future.

73. The point was also made<sup>62</sup> that it was important for members of the Advisory Group to understand that they needed to reflect the views of a wide segment of the community from which they were selected.

74. Several speakers commented on the need for some form of rotation among Advisory Group members. There was a general agreement for some continuity, while bringing in new members every year. Several speakers also called for a transparent process<sup>63</sup>.

75. Several contributions called for a more structured approach in appointing the Advisory Group or a multi-stakeholder bureau as referred to in the Tunis Agenda paragraph 78(b)<sup>64</sup>. One contribution<sup>65</sup> included a call for a new, democratically or consensually appointed multi-

---

<sup>59</sup> Association of Progressive Communication (APC)

<sup>60</sup> APC

<sup>61</sup> AfriNIC

<sup>62</sup> ITAA, WITSA

<sup>63</sup> ICC/BASIS, ETNO, ITAA, WITSA, APC

<sup>64</sup> Joint Statement by Argentina and Brazil

<sup>65</sup> Jeremy Malcolm

stakeholder body. This new body would be responsible for many of the activities currently done by the Advisory Group and the Secretariat, including the preparation of the agenda, programme and synthesis papers. It would also be responsible for creating background briefing reports that would be used by the plenary and would produce responses to the substantive issues, based on its assessment of the consensus within the plenary. This group would also be responsible for choosing the Secretariat and any necessary Advisory Groups. The multi-stakeholder body itself could be selected by a form of nominating committee process that would select “a balanced group of individuals appointed as representatives of their stakeholder groups”.

76. Others opposed the creation of such a bureau, arguing that the IGF should preserve its unique character and should therefore not resort to traditional UN procedures. It would be vital that all stakeholder groups be represented in the Advisory Group, after a call from the IGF Secretariat, and there should not be any subquotas<sup>66</sup>.

#### **D. The Dynamic Coalitions**

77. It was generally felt that the Dynamic Coalitions that emerged from the Athens meeting had been a great innovation and in many ways become a distinctive feature of the IGF. Dynamic Coalitions could also broaden its impact. One speaker held the view that they were what he called “a central component of the fact that the IGF is not only an annual event but also a process”<sup>67</sup>.

78. The multi-stakeholder principle was generally seen as the most important defining element of the Dynamic Coalitions. There was support for the need to develop some criteria for the recognition of a Dynamic Coalition, but it was felt that at this stage it was necessary to be flexible, as they were still in an experimental phase. It was important that they remained open to all stakeholders, where possible, with actual participation by multiple stakeholders from different regions<sup>68</sup>.

79. The point was made that these Dynamic Coalitions were representative of a larger constituency and not just the outcome of a few individuals. Also, the topic should be in line with the IGF mandate and the IGF agenda. They should not be pure advocacy groups<sup>69</sup>.

80. One contribution<sup>70</sup> called for “institutional checks and balances to ensure the structure of a Dynamic Coalition” and a “formal mechanism by which reports or recommendations by the Dynamic Coalitions could be received by the IGF’s plenary body as an input to its policy-setting role”.

81. It was also pointed out<sup>71</sup> that the goal of the Dynamic Coalitions was not just to provide a space for dialogue, but they should go beyond dialogue, into some form of action. A Dynamic Coalition should be “IGF-plus” and capable of achieving something.

---

<sup>66</sup> ITAA, WITSA, ICC/BASIS

<sup>67</sup> France

<sup>68</sup> Co-Chair Nitin Desai, China

<sup>69</sup> ICC/BASIS

<sup>70</sup> Jeremy Malcolm

<sup>71</sup> Co-Chair Nitin Desai

#### **IV. The Way Forward**

82. There was a shared awareness that the IGF was a new model of international cooperation and could not be seen as a traditional UN-style conference. It was also pointed out that its format was in the forefront of multilateral policy-making and could set precedents for a renewed and upgraded style of multilateral conferences<sup>72</sup>.

83. Several contributions looked at the development from the Athens meeting to Rio de Janeiro and the subsequent meetings and the point was made that there was a need for a certain vision on how the IGF would evolve and some conception of how this forum was going to develop<sup>73</sup>.

84. The view<sup>74</sup> was expressed that the Athens meeting led to grounds for the important work yet to be done towards the full implementation of the IGF mandate. The Rio de Janeiro meeting would thus represent one step ahead in the incremental IGF process, in accordance with its mandate as contained in the Tunis Agenda”.

85. Some wanted the IGF to develop its own structures, which would allow it to be more results-oriented. The view was expressed that, in the next three planned editions, the IGF should evolve into a results-oriented body so as to provide the international community with substantive recommendations<sup>75</sup>. The IGF working methods should be designed accordingly<sup>76</sup> and there was a need for reassessing the direction in which the IGF was moving. There should be clearly defined short and long-term goals within the Tunis framework. It was also suggested benchmarking issues from one IGF to another in order be able to adjust the expectations of the public policy domain with advance of technology<sup>77</sup>.

86. Others<sup>78</sup> saw the best recipe for success in continuing the forum along the same principles; namely, by promoting the interactive exchange of ideas among all stakeholders on an equal footing. In this vision, “the IGF provides a platform for representatives of different parts of the world and different stakeholders to gather and discuss in an open, informal setting, without the pressure resulting from having to achieve negotiated outcomes, thus offering exactly the right venue and setting for increasing global understanding and cooperation”<sup>79</sup>.

87. The view was held<sup>80</sup> that the IGF would grow in stature and deliver increasing value for so long as it encouraged dialogue, best practices, dynamic collaboration, community building and experience sharing. Also, the notion of multi-stakeholderism should be carried forward and

---

<sup>72</sup> Co-Chair Hadil da Rocha Vianna

<sup>73</sup> Co-Chair Nitin Desai

<sup>74</sup> Co-Chair Hadil da Rocha Vianna

<sup>75</sup> Brazil

<sup>76</sup> China

<sup>77</sup> India

<sup>78</sup> Portugal on behalf of the European Union, also Nippon Keidanren, Japan, ISOC, ICC/BASIS, ITAA, WITSA

<sup>79</sup> Portugal on behalf of the European Union

<sup>80</sup> ISOC



improved, including the understanding on how to be adequately applied<sup>81</sup>. The point was made<sup>82</sup> that debates held within the IGF undoubtedly would influence the future behaviour of governments, business and civil society. In this way, the IGF played an important and influential role in guiding Internet culture in a positive direction.

88. There was a general understanding that it would be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the functioning of the IGF as well as the role, function and composition of the Advisory Group in a follow-on session early in 2008 as part of the overall assessment of the achievements of the Rio de Janeiro meeting.

---

<sup>81</sup> David Allen

<sup>82</sup> Nippon Keidanren

## **Annex I**

### **List of Submissions**

1. People's Republic of China; Comments on the Draft Programme Outline for the Second Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
2. Council of Europe - Building a Free and Safe Internet.
3. International Chamber of Commerce/Business Action to Support the Information Society (BASIS).
  - General - Further updated ICC matrix of issues related to the Internet and organizations dealing with them May 2006. This matrix is the updated version of the 13 September 2004 ICC matrix on these issues.
  - Openness
    - ICC policy statement The impact of Internet content regulation, November 2002.
    - ICC policy statement on Regulating the Delivery of Audiovisual Content over the Internet.
  - Security
    - ICC Framework for consultation and drafting of Information Compliance obligations.
    - ICC toolkits.
      - Assurance for executives.
      - Privacy toolkit.
      - Securing your business.
    - 'Spam' and unsolicited commercial electronic messages ICC policy statement, December 2004.
  - Access
    - Telecoms Liberalization Guide.
    - Policy statement on Broadband Deployment.
    - Storage of Traffic data for law enforcement purposes.
    - ICC policy recommendations on global IT sourcing.
    - Policy Statement on Open Source Software.
  - Diversity
    - Issues paper on Internationalized Domain Names.
    - Policy Statement on Open Source Software.
4. European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO) - Reflection Document in Reply to the Consultation "Preparing for the second Meeting of the IGF".
5. Internet Society (ISOC) - Internet governance priorities: findings from the ISOC INET meeting in Abuja, Nigeria.

6. Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) - Input for the IGF in Rio 2007.
7. IT for Change - Four Critical Issues for the IGF, Rio, from a Southern Perspective.
8. Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) - Substantial Contribution to the Internet Governance Forum.
9. Cheryl Preston, Professor of Law, and Brent A. Little, Brigham Young University - ICANN can: Contracts and Porn Sites.
10. Christopher R. Reed, M.P.P Candidate, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan; Cheryl Preston, Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, Brigham Young University; Scott R. Rasmussen, J.D. Candidate, Brigham Young University - Children and Internet Pornography: The Nature of the Problem and the Technologies for a Solution.
11. Jeremy Malcolm - Recommendations for the Internet Governance Forum.
12. Joanna Kulesza, PhD student at the faculty of Law and Administration, University of Lodz, Poland - New Technologies and the Need for a Uniform Legal System.
13. Longe, O.B., University of Ibadan, Nigeria; Chiemekwe, S.C., University of Benin, Nigeria; Longe, F.A., Lead City University, Ibadan, Nigeria - Intermediary mediated Cybercrime: Internet Access Points and the Facilitation of Cybercrimes in Nigeria.

## Annex II

### Glossary of Internet Governance Terms

<b>AfriNIC</b>	Regional Registry for Internet Number Resources for Africa (Member of NRO)
<b>APC</b>	Association for Progressive Communication
<b>ASCII</b>	American Standard Code for Information Interchange; seven-bit encoding of the Roman alphabet
<b>ccTLD</b>	Country code top-level domain, such as .gr (Greece), .br (Brazil) or .in (India)
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>CSIRTs</b>	Computer Security Incident Response Teams
<b>DNS</b>	Domain name system: translates domain names into IP addresses
<b>DRM</b>	Digital Rights Management
<b>DOI</b>	Digital Object Identifier
<b>ETNO</b>	European Telecommunications Networks Operators Association
<b>F/OSS</b>	Free and Open Source Software
<b>GAC</b>	Governmental Advisory Committee (to ICANN)
<b>gTLD</b>	Generic top-level domain, such as .com, .int, .net, .org, .info
<b>IANA</b>	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
<b>ICANN</b>	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
<b>ICC</b>	International Chamber of Commerce
<b>ICC/BASIS</b>	ICC Business Action to Support the Information Society.
<b>ICT</b>	Information and communication technology
<b>ICT4D</b>	Information and communication technology for development
<b>IDN</b>	Internationalized domain names: Web addresses using a non-ASCII character set
<b>IETF</b>	Internet Engineering Task Force
<b>IGF</b>	Internet Governance Forum
<b>IGOs</b>	Intergovernmental organizations

<b>IP</b>	Internet Protocol
<b>IP Address</b>	Internet Protocol address: a unique identifier corresponding to each computer or device on an IP network. Currently there are two types of IP addresses in active use. IP version 4 (IPv4) and IP version 6 (IPv6). IPv4 (which uses 32 bit numbers) has been used since 1983 and is still the most commonly used version. Deployment of the IPv6 protocol began in 1999. IPv6 addresses are 128-bit numbers.
<b>IPRs</b>	Intellectual property rights
<b>IPv4</b>	Version 4 of the Internet Protocol
<b>IPv6</b>	Version 6 of the Internet Protocol
<b>IRA</b>	International Reference Alphabet
<b>ISOC</b>	Internet Society
<b>ISP</b>	Internet Service Provider
<b>ITAA</b>	Information Technology Association of America
<b>ITU</b>	International Telecommunication Union
<b>IXPs</b>	Internet exchange points
<b>LACNIC</b>	Latin American and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry (Member of NRO)
<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NAPs</b>	Network access points
<b>NGN</b>	Next generation network
<b>NRO</b>	Number Resource Organization, grouping all RIRs – see below
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>Registrar</b>	A body approved (‘accredited’) by a registry to sell/register domain names on its behalf.
<b>Registry</b>	A registry is a company or organization that maintains a centralized registry database for the TLDs or for IP address blocks (e.g. the RIRs — see below). Some registries operate without registrars at all and some operate with registrars but also allow direct registrations via the registry.
<b>RIRs</b>	Regional Internet registries. These not-for-profit organizations are responsible for distributing IP

addresses on a regional level to Internet service providers and local registries.

<b>Root servers</b>	Servers that contain pointers to the authoritative name servers for all TLDs. In addition to the “original” 13 root servers carrying the IANA managed root zone file, there are now large number of Anycast servers that provide identical information and which have been deployed worldwide by some of the original 12 operators.
<b>Root zone file</b>	Master file containing pointers to name servers for all TLDs
<b>SMEs</b>	Small and medium-sized enterprises
<b>TLD</b>	Top-level domain (see also ccTLD and gTLD)
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>WGIG</b>	Working Group on Internet Governance
<b>WHOIS</b>	WHOIS is a transaction oriented query/response protocol that is widely used to provide information services to Internet users. While originally used by most (but not all) TLD Registry operators to provide “white pages” services and information about registered domain names, current deployments cover a much broader range of information services, including RIR WHOIS look-ups for IP address allocation information.
<b>WSIS</b>	World Summit on Information Society
<b>WITSA</b>	World Information Technology and Services Alliance
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization